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1. Introduction 
A large body of literature has examined international grain trade in imperfectly competitive 
models by using different analytical settings
2. This paper develops a model that differs from 
previous ones, since it specifically takes into account export strategies used by multinational 
firms and considers their ability to exploit economies of scale.  
Even though the issue concerning the degree of competition on the international grain market 
is still controversial
3, it is a matter of fact that during the past fifty years the grain trading 
industry in important exporting countries, like the US and the EU, has been highly 
concentrated. In fact, a small number of multinational exporting firms account for a large 
share of the international market and in this industry there have been few exits and almost no 
newcomers
4. This market structure may be explained with the presence of scale economies 
which prevent newcomers from entering the industry. In an early contribution, Caves (1977) 
has stressed the relevance of two kinds of scale economies in the international grain trading 
industry: intangible and tangible scale economies; the former arise from the need for the firm 
to acquire information which is essential for the grain trading industry but requires high fixed 
costs, and acts as a barrier to enter this industry; the latter arise from the acquisition of 
facilities for grain storage, handling and transportation, which also require high initial costs. 
More recent studies confirm the relevance of these tangible economies of scale (e.g. Wilson, 
Dahl, 1999). Nowadays, large grain trading firms mainly do direct exports, i.e. they maintain 
                                                 
2 Due to the severe space constraints, it is not possible to include an exhaustive list of references on this topic. 
Contributions which deal more specifically with the issues addressed in this paper in an oligopolistic framework 
include Thursby (1988), Hamilton, Stiegert (2002), McCorriston, MacLaren (2005). 
3 Relevant contributions on this issue are, among others, Caves, Pugel (1982), Patterson, Abbott (1994). 
4 Scoppola (1995) estimates the multinationals share of grain exports in the eighties to be the 70% in the US and 
the 90% in the EU. Kneen (2002) reports that in 1997 Cargill was exporting the 25% of US grain exports. 
Wilson, Dahl (1999) estimate the share of Continental Grain (which was acquired in 1998 by Cargill) to be the 
20% of US grain exports.   
  1a direct control over all exporting /importing functions using their own facilities even in the 
importing countries. In this paper this marketing strategy, which requires initial fixed costs, is 
assumed to be chosen by private firms in order to avoid the transaction costs arising from 
negotiating with downstream operators. The explanation of direct exports, thus, is based on 
the hypothesis of incompleteness of contracts in the international transactions, initially 
developed in the literature on multinational firms (Caves, 1996) and more recently in the 
international trade theories (Spencer, 2005).  
On the other hand, exports from two important grain exporters, Canada and Australia, are 
managed by a state trading enterprise (hereinafter “STE”); several papers have emphasized 
the distinctive nature of the STEs with respect to the private firms, mainly concentrating on 
their peculiar objective function (e.g. Carter et al., 1998;  McCorriston, MacLaren, 2005).  
In this paper the focus is on the different exporting strategies used by the two firms: while the  
multinational firm may choose direct export, the STE is assumed to export only indirectly as 
it operates as a “pure middlemen”, that is, it allows other firms to perform most of the 
international marketing functions and, thus, does not incur in fixed costs generating tangible 
economies of scale. This means that if transaction costs in international trade are very high, 
the multinational has a competitive advantage with respect to the STE, since it can exploit the 
economies of scale and skip transaction costs. These features have been included in a two-
stage duopoly model.  
A further distinctive feature of the model presented in this paper is that market structure is 
endogenous, that is, it is the outcome of the first stage of the game: the multinational firm 
chooses its export strategy according to the relative values of transaction and fixed costs; the 
resulting market structure may thus differ not only, as usual, because of the number of firms, 
but also because of the different export policies followed by the multinational firm.   
  2The analytical framework is based on a partial equilibrium model of international trade which 
includes multinational firms developed by Horstmann, Markusen (1992) and Markusen 
(2002). However, the setting is substantially different, since it considers specific features of 
the international grain trade
5. The results of the game are examined by using numerical 
examples. First, simulations have been carried out by assuming that the two firms face the 
same domestic costs; then, it has been assumed that the domestic costs differ in order to study 
STE’s potential competitive (dis)advantages. The results show that external shocks on export 
markets may cause different effects on trade compared to those predicted by models which do 
not take economies of scale into consideration and take for granted that private traders export 
only indirectly.  
On the whole, the analytical framework developed herein has some interesting policy 
implications for the ongoing WTO negotiations in the DDA round on the possible effects of 
regulating STEs. The model developed in this paper shows that a reduction of the subsidy to 
the exporting STE may result in a replacement of the STE by the multinational, even though 
the final market structure crucially depends upon the initial market structure. Further, the 
paper also emphasizes that a liberalization of an importing STE may largely affect market 
structure and, accordingly, the market shares of the exporting countries. 
2. The model 
This model considers two exporting countries (i and j) and one importing country (z) of a 
homogeneous agricultural product. Exports from country i are managed by a multinational 
firm, while a STE has the exclusive right to purchase and export from country j; both firms 
sell on their own domestic market, export to country z , and to the other firm’s market
6. Let pi, 
                                                 
5 In the model developed by Horstmann, Markusen (1992) and Markusen (2002) there are two countries and 
two-ways flows of trade and investments; this paper considers three countries, and between the exporters and the 
importer there are one-way flows. Further, in this paper only one firm may invest abroad and exploit economies 
of scale.  
6 This setting is aimed at representing some of the key features of competition among two of the most important 
grain exporters, i.e. the USA and Canada: exports are carried out by a few multinational firms and a STE, which 
  3pj and pz be the inverse demand curve; we assume linear functional forms and identical 
demand in the two exporting countries:  ) ( i i i XS XM p + − = β α ,  ) ( j j j XS XM p + − = β α  
and  ) ( z z z XS XM p + − = δ λ  with XM and XS being exports/sales, respectively, of the 
multinational firm and of the STE.  
The multinational firm may export to z indirectly or directly: in the first case, the 
multinational firm faces transaction costs tz, while in the second case it faces initial fixed costs 
Dz, but does not face transaction costs. The multinational firm, thus, chooses direct (indirect) 
exports if transaction costs (fixed cost) are high relative to fixed costs (transaction costs). 
Both firms purchase and export only domestic agricultural products, sustaining marginal costs 
(ci and cj), which are assumed to be constant
7, and sell part of the products on the domestic 
market. These also bear firm-specific fixed costs, (Hm and Hs) which include the cost of 
acquiring intangible assets which are joint inputs in trading across all markets. Firm-specific 
fixed costs H are assumed to be high relative to demand, thus markets can support, at the most, 
one or two firms; further, the said costs are considered to be faced by firms on the domestic 
market. Markets are assumed to be segmented, so that firms can price independently in the 
three markets
8. The firms play a two-stage game. In the first stage, firms choose the entry 
strategy. Moves in the first stage of the game are assumed to be simultaneous. In the second 
stage, the firms play a Cournot game. The game is solved backwards, by first considering the 
second stage decision.  
The profit Mz of the multinational firm in the market z, when it chooses indirect exports is: 
[] z z i z z z z XM t c XM XS XM M ) ( ) ( + − + − = δ λ     (1) 
                                                                                                                                                          
are often rivals on the same export market; albeit limited, there is also some trade between the two exporting 
countries.  Production of country z is assumed to be zero. 
7 The assumption of constant marginal costs, routinely used in the new trade theory models, is obviously 
simplistic; the model also ignores the trade effects of STEs, due to the producer payment system, pooling and 
cross-subsidisation. However, this seems to be less relevant for this paper which focuses on the trade effects of 
different market structures, rather than on the effects of input pricing strategies, although the latter may affect the 
competitive position of the STE.   
8 Evidence of price discrimination practices by the Canadian Wheat Board has been provided, among others, by 
Brooks, Schmitz, (1999).  
  4The STE is assumed to maximize the producers’ welfare Sz:  
[] z z z j z z z z XS t dXS c XS XS XM S − − + − = ∫ ) ( δ λ     (2) 
If the multinational exports directly to z the profit equation is:  
[]z zd i zd zd zd zd D XM c XM XS XM M − − + − = ) ( δ λ     (3) 
Table 1 reports the equilibrium profits in the second stage of the game for all market 
structures
9. The payoff to the multinational firm (STE) in each outcome of the game is 
obtained by adding up the equilibrium profits on the three markets, corresponding to the 
outcome of the game (Table 2)
10. 
3. Trade and market structures with cost symmetry  
The results for this model are illustrated by using numerical examples; the choice of the 
values of the parameter is aimed at reproducing some of the key features of the international 
grain trade
11. The main assumptions are the following. 
Firstly, country z is larger than countries i and j; this assumption is consistent with the limited 
size of the US and Canadian grain markets, with respect to the export markets. Secondly, the 
firm-specific fixed cost H is high enough to make profits negative in some market structures; 
for example, it is assumed that grain trading is not profitable if limited to the domestic market 
and to the rival’s market. Thirdly, simulations are based on a cost symmetry hypothesis, i.e. it 
is assumed that the two firms face the same firm-specific fixed costs and the same marginal 
and transaction costs.  
                                                 
9 By assuming that the multinational (STE) does export/sell to/in one or more markets, all profits and exports in 
duopoly and monopoly can be easily obtained. Derivation merely involves computation of Cournot equilibria 
under different market structures.   
10 Some actions have been excluded from the first stage of the game: i) the STE exports to i and/or to z without 
selling on the domestic market; ii) the multinational exports to j and/or to z without selling on the domestic 
market. Given the assumptions of the model, the dimension of the pay-off matrix is 7*5.     
11 Obviously, the choice of the values of the parameters may affect the magnitude of the trade effects and also 
the “point” at which market structure may change; however, they do not influence the direction of the changes. 
  5The only difference between the two firms, therefore, is their export strategy; if transaction 
costs in country z are high, the multinational firm has an advantage since it can exploit the 
economies of scale and skip transaction costs.  
Consider how the Nash equilibrium is affected by different values of costs in market z: if tz is 
large relative to Dz, then the optimal choice of the multinational firm, whatever the choice of 
the STE, is to export directly to market z; the greater tz is, the larger is STE’s disadvantage. If 
transaction costs become very high, STE’s profits become negative and the optimal choice of 
the STE is the no entry option. On the other hand, if Dz is high enough, the multinational firm 
opts for indirect exportation and the STE enters because its profits become positive
12.   
Figure 1 shows the resulting Nash equilibrium regimes as a function of Dz and tz. In area 1 the 
equilibrium market structure is a duopoly, with both firms exporting indirectly
13. Area 2 
denotes again a duopoly, but the multinational opts for direct exports. Finally, in area 3 the 
multinational firm is a monopolist and exports directly. Table 3 reports the changes in total 
exports, market shares and prices, when transaction and fixed costs change
14. 
When both Dz and tz are zero, there is a multiple Nash equilibrium and regimes 1 and 2 are 
equivalent. The two firms operate in a completely symmetrical framework and, as expected, 
they have an equal market share. This situation is used as a benchmark to evaluate the effects 
that a change in the two variables has on trade.  
Now consider the effect of an increase of tz. If fixed costs are relatively low, then the 
multinational firm opts for direct exports and regime 2 prevails. This implies a reduction in 
the exported volumes and a change in market shares: the multinational firm gains, while the 
                                                 
12 The chosen parameter values have produced an asymmetric set of market structures, as under certain 
conditions the STE optimal choice is not to enter, but this does not happen for the multinational. Obviously, it is 
sufficient to change the hypothesis underlying the simulations to revert the outcome: for example, if we assume 
that the multinational faces fixed cost Hm higher than those faced by the STE Hs, then the Nash equilibrium 
regimes also include a monopoly of the STE. 
13 In figure 1, the values of the other parameters are the following: α=30; β=1; λ=60; δ=1; Hm=Hs=200; ci =1; 
cj=1; ti= tj =7.  
14 Exports, market shares and prices in countries  i and j are not reported due to the space constraint; given the 
simulation assumptions, market shares and total exports are rather stable across all Dz and tz values, with the only 
exception of region 3, where the multinational accounts for the entire i and j markets. 
  6STE loses. If transaction costs become high enough, the STE chooses not to enter the market 
(region 3); in this case, the collapse of the regime into a multinational monopoly implies an 
overall fall of the quantities being exported and an increase in prices.  
On the other hand, if transaction costs are relatively low but above zero, an increase in the 
fixed costs may result in a change of the multinational firm’s exporting strategy from direct 
(region 2) to indirect exportation (region 1). This implies a reduction of the overall exported 
volumes and a decrease in the multinational’s market share (Table 3).   
An interesting insight from Figure 1 is that starting from a point on the right side of area 1 (a 
“symmetric” duopoly), everything else held constant, a decrease in the fixed costs may shift 
the market structure to region 3. This happens because by shifting to direct exports, the 
multinational firm reduces variable costs and increases exports; as a consequence, STE’s 
exports decrease and, given the high values of transaction costs, profits become negative. This 
result is also clear when comparing STE’s exports and profits under region 1 market structure  
with those of region 2 (Table 1).  
These results may have some interesting implications. Under the assumptions made, structural 
changes in foreign markets may have different effects from those predicted when economies 
of scale are ignored, and it is taken for granted that both the STE and the multinational firm 
enter the foreign market by means of indirect exportation. The consequences of assuming 
exogenous market structures in terms of predictable trade effects may be relevant: an increase 
of tz would result in an overall decrease of exports, leaving market shares unchanged (the shift 
is toward the right-hand side of Figure 1, but always remaining within the same region 1). On 
the contrary, with economies of scale and endogenous market structures, the external shock 
produces a change in market structure leading to significant changes in market shares. In 
addition, in a model disregarding economies of scale and direct exports, a change in the fixed 
  7costs would have no trade effects; whereas, if the option of direct exports is also taken into 
account, there would be significant changes in the market structure, exports and market shares. 
A further implication is that the effects of an external shock on trade depend on the starting 
condition. As already mentioned, if the starting regime is placed in the lower part of region 1, 
an increase in transaction costs changes the market structure, but this does not occur if the 
initial point is in the upper part of region 1. This means that, before evaluating the effects of a 
shock on trade, the initial regime should be known and its implications considered.         
4. Trade and market structures with domestic cost asymmetries  
In a second set of simulations, cost asymmetry has been considered by assuming that cj ≠ ci . 
This hypothesis is aimed at taking into account, on one hand, the potential inefficiencies of 
the STE, which have been underlined by some authors (e.g. Carter, Loyns, Berwald, 1998)   
(c j > ci.) and, on the other hand, the competitive advantage of STE due, for example, to the 
various benefits granted by its government, and in this case  c j < ci, .  The objective here is 
twofold: to check whether the assumption of domestic cost symmetry influences the results; 
and to analyze the effect of a change of the STE competitive (dis)advantages.    
Figure 2 shows the Nash equilibrium regimes as a function of (cj-ci) and tz. The benchmark 
here is cj-ci = 0 and tz=0,  i.e. the symmetry case already examined above. In that case, if tz is 
relatively low, region 1 market structure prevails, while for tz >20 there is a shift toward a 
duopoly with direct exports (region 2) which collapses into a monopoly when tz> 25. If the 
multinational firm has a significant cost advantage with respect to the STE (cj-ci = 2), then an 
increase of tz would shift market structure directly from region 1 to region 3, that is, to a 
monopoly of the multinational firm. Finally, if the STE has a competitive advantage with 
respect to the multinational (cj-ci = -1), then even a large increase in the transaction costs 
would not lead to a monopoly. The trade effects of these changes are reported in Table 4.  
  8It should be noted that, in all scenarios with asymmetric costs, even if tz=0, the two firms’ 
market shares differ because of their different competitive position. Overall, trade effects are 
qualitatively similar across all values of cj-ci: an increase of tz yields a reduction of exports 
and a change of market shares (a decrease of the STE’s share and an increase in that of the 
multinational). Thus, the main difference between the asymmetric and symmetric cases is the 
“point” at which there is a change in the market structure: the higher the cost gap cj-ci, the 
lower the level of transaction costs causing a shift towards a monopoly by the multinational 
firm.  
A second issue is related to the impact of an increase in the cost gap cj-ci due, for example, to 
a reduction in the support given to the STE by its government. If transaction costs are low 
relative to fixed costs and the initial regime is placed in region 1, market structure does not 
change. However, if transaction costs are high (i.e. the initial regime is placed in region 2), an 
increase of the STE costs may result in a monopoly of the multinational firm. Again, the 
impact of any policy change on trade crucially depends upon the initial regime. 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper has developed a model of international grain trade by assuming imperfect 
competititon, economies of scale and endogenous market structures. The hypotheses of the 
model are aimed at capturing some of the basic features of the international grain trading 
industry: few multinational exporting firms compete with STEs; intangible economies of 
scale act as barriers to entering the industry; multinational firms may choose among two 
exporting strategies, i.e. direct versus indirect exportation. The main distinctive feature of the 
model, with respect to most international trade model for agricultural products, is the fact that 
it takes in consideration direct exportation as a specific practice used by the multinationals to 
avoid transaction costs.   
  9The numerical examples have shown how the model may lead to predictions which differ 
from those reached by models which do not consider economies of scale. More specifically, 
the main findings are the following:  
a) economic and policy changes in foreign markets affecting the relative values of transaction 
and fixed costs of the international grain trading, may result in a change of market structures 
and, consequently, of market shares; 
b) the effects of an external shock on trade depend on the initial market structure. This means 
that before evaluating the effects of a shock on trade one should determine the initial regime.       
c) the assumption that there is a gap between firms’ domestic costs does not significantly 
change the outcome of the game, even though it may affect the “point” (i.e. the relative values 
of transaction and fixed costs) at which the market structure changes.  
d) the effect of a worsening of the STE’s competitive position, in relation to that of the 
multinational, depends again on the starting market structure. 
These results may have relevant policy implications for the current negotiation within the 
WTO DDA round on disciplinating STEs. One of the main concerns about regulating 
exporting STEs is dealing with the possible replacement of the STE by the private 
multinational firms, which may not ensure an increase in competition and a move towards 
free trade (e.g. Fulton, Larue, Veeman, 2001, Young, 2005, Furtan, 2005). This model shows 
how, if the competitive position of the STE is worsened because, for example, the support it 
receives from its government is reduced, a multinational monopoly could be established. 
However, this may happen only if the multinational firm already exports directly (the starting 
regime is placed in region 2 of Figure 2), while it cannot occur if transaction costs are low 
relative to fixed costs (the initial equilibrium is placed in region 1).  
Therefore, the first implication of the model is that, the impact a reduction of implicit 
subsidies to the STE has on trade may also depend on the transaction and fixed costs incurred 
  10by firms on foreign markets: if the former are relatively low, then a reduction of the subsidies 
to the STE only leads to a reduction of its market share; however, if transaction costs are high 
relative to fixed costs, a reduction of subsidies to the STE may cause the replacement of the 
STE on the foreign market by the multinational.  
Secondly, this model can also give an insight into the effects of policy changes in the 
importing countries. Privatisation of importing functions can make the option of direct 
exportation more profitable for the multinational. The replacement of a state agency with 
several private importers may imply an increase of purchase specifications and a reduction of 
the average size of transactions, leading to a substantial increase in transaction costs (Wilson, 
Dahl, 1999). On the other hand, the removal of legislative restrictions to investments by 
foreign companies results in reducing fixed costs linked with direct exports. These changes 
make the option of direct export more profitable for the multinational which may increase its 
market shares at the expenses of the exporting STE. The second implication of the model, 
thus, is that the elimination of an importing STE may result in an increase of the market share 
of countries whose exports are managed by multinational firms.     
The third implication is that for countries whose exports are managed by a single-desk STE, 
the elimination of subsidies to exporting STEs may be a more convenient outcome of WTO 
negotiations than a full liberalization of importing STEs. Let us assume that before 
liberalization there is a region 1 regime (i.e. a duopoly with indirect exports): a reduction of 
subsidies to the exporting STE leaves unchanged the market structure and, accordingly, the 
STE loses market share, but it is not forced out from the market by the multinational firm. 
However if, everything else held constant, the importing STE is eliminated, the market 
structure may move towards regions 2 or 3, that is, it may collapse in a multinational firm 
monopoly.  
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Table 2: The pay-off matrix
{i, j, 0} {i, j, z} {0, j, z} {0, j, 0} {0, 0, 0}
{i, j, 0}    M ii+M jj, S jj+S ii   M ii+M jj, S jj+S ii+S oz   M i0+M jj, S jj+S oz   M i0+M jj, S jj   M i0+M j0,  0
{i, j, z}  M ii+M jj+M z0 , S jj+S ii M ii+M jj+M zz, 
S jj+S ii+S zz
M i0+M jj+M zz, 
S jj+S zz
M i0+M jj+M z0 , S jj M i0+M j0+M z0 , 0
{i, 0, z}  M ii+M z0, S 0j+S ii M ii+M zz, S 0j+S ii+S zz M i0+M zz, S 0j+S zz M i0+M z0 , S 0j M i0+M z0 , 0
{i, 0, 0}    M ii, S ii+S 0j   M ii, S ii+S 0j+S 0z   M i0, S 0j+S 0z   M i0, S 0j   M i0, 0
{0, 0, 0} 0, S 0j+S 0i 0, S 0j+S 0i+S 0z 0, S 0j+S 0z  0 , S 0j    0 , 0
{i, j, zd} M ii+M jj+M zd0 , S jj+S ii M ii+M j+M zd , 
S jj+S ii+S zd
M i0+M jj+M zd , 
S jj+S zd
M i0+M jj+M zd0, S jj M i0+M j0+M zd0 , 0
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Table 3: Exports, prices and market shares as a function of fixed and transaction costs (c j- c i=0)
0 5 10 15 20 25
P z 100 108 116 124 132 148
0 Xz 1 0 0 9 69 28 78 37 5
XM z (%) 50 56.6 63.9 71.8 80.6 100
XS z (%) 50 43.4 36.1 28.2 19.4 0
P z 100 116 132 124 132 148
100 X z 1 0 0 9 28 38 78 37 5
XM z (%) 50 50 50 71.8 80.6 100
D z XS z (%) 50 50 50 28.2 19.4 0
P z 100 116 132 148 132 148
300 X z 1 0 0 9 28 37 58 37 5
XM z (%) 50 50 50 50 80.6 100
XS z (%) 50 50 50 50 19.4 0
P z 100 116 132 148 165 181
500 X z 1 0 0 9 28 37 56 65 8
XM z (%) 50 50 50 50 50 50




Table 4: Exports, prices and market shares as a function of (c j-c i) and transaction costs (D z=300)
0 5 10 15 20 25
P z 98 115 131 147 131 139
-1 Xz 101 92 84 75 84 80
XM z (%) 48.7 48.6 48.5 48.3 78.8 88.3
XS z (%) 51.3 51.4 51.5 51.7 21.2 11.7
P z 100 116 131 148 132 148
 (c j - c i) 0 X z 100 92 83 75 83 75
XM z (%) 50 50 50.0 50.0 80.6 100
XS z (%) 50 50 50.0 50 19 0
P z 102 118 134 150 148 148
1 X z 99 91 82 91 75 75
XM z (%) 51.3 51.4 51.5 51 100 100
XS z (%) 48.7 48.6 48.5 49 0 0
P z 103 119 135 152 168 148
2 X z 98 90 81 119 64 75
XM z (%) 51.3 51.4 51.5 51 100 100
XS z (%) 48.7 48.6 48.5 49 0 0
t z
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Figure 1: Market structure as a function of fixed and transaction costs (cj-ci=0) 
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